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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 1960, Appellant Ben Stewart (Plaintiff below) brought an action against Respondent Adeline :JL Ingalls (Defendant below) to declare certain
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bank accounts with Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Salt Lake City, Utah, and American Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake City, Utah, totaling $20,247.09, to be his sole and separate property.
The Complaint alleges that on or about April 2, 1959,
Appellant placed the name of the Respondent, Adeline
M. Ingalls, on the t'vo savings accounts, that the Respondent never put any funds into either of said savings
accounts, that Appellant was never indebted to the Respondent, that Ap·pellant did not realize that the Respondent would obtain an inheritable interest by such
action or that the Respondent would have said bank
accounts at her disposal; and further, that since placing
her name on said accounts he had given her some
$4,000.00, this being the full amount he intended her to
receive from his estate. (R. Case No. 12.4252, 1-2).
Contemporaneously with the filing of the action,
notice was sent to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association and to American Savings and Loan Association ( R. Case No. 124797, 6 and ·Case No. 124798,
10) instructing them not to per1nit Respondent to withdraw any funds and informing them that proper measures were being taken to remove her name from the
respective accounts.
On April 1, 1960, Respondent made a Motion to
Dismiss Appellant's ·Complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a claiin upon 'vhich any relief could be
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granted (R. Case No. 124252, 7.) Meanwhile, on February 7, 19GO, Appellant Ben Stewart died, and on March
.!-, 1960, an order substituting 0. A. Tangren as executor
of the estate of Ben Stewart was entered by the .District Court ( R. Case No. 124252, 5).
On I\Iarch 16, 1960, Respondent initiated an action
against Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association and 0. A. Tangren, executor of the estate of Ben
Ste,vart, deceased, and against the American Savings
and Loan Association and 0. A. Tangren, executor of
the estate of Ben Stewart, deceased, to recover the
rnoneys desposited in the respective accounts. (R. Case
Xo. 124798, 1-3 and Case No. 124797, 1-3).
On April 11, 1960, an Answer and Counterclaim was
filed by the Appellant to these two suits (·Case No.
1:2-!797, 15-18 and Case No. 124798, 11-14).
A ~lotion for Summary Judgment was then filed by
Respondent involving the case of the two banks (R. ·Case
Xo. 124797, 20-21 and Case No. 124798, 25-26), and at the
hearing on May 31, 1960, it was stipulated that the two
signature cards which were at issue in the action could
be incorporated in the Plaintiff's Complaint and that
all three cases could be consolidated on the Respondent's
Jiotion for Summary Judgment (R. Case No. 124252,
16-17). In the same proceeding, the money having been

paid into Court by the Prudential Federal Savings and
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Loan Association and the American Savings and Loan
Association, Summary Judgment could be entered
against the other parties~r~~ ~Jpce they had no interest in the controversy. (R. _,_,_-:.~-7--).
The two signature card agreements were opened on
or about April 2, 1959, and read in part as follows:
As Joint Tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common, and not as tenants
by the entirety, the undersigned hereby apply for
a membership and a withdrawable account in the
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, same to be issued subject to the provisions
of the Laws under which the Association is organized and operating and the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Association.
You are directed to act pursuant to any one
or more of the joint tenants' signatures, shown
below, in any manner in connection "\Yith this account and to pay, without any liability for such
payment, to any one or the survivor or survivors
at any tin1e. It is agreed by the signatory parties
with each other and by the parties V\rith you that
any funds placed in or added to the account by
any one of the parties is and shall be conclusively
intended to be a gift at that ti1ne of such funds
to the other signatory party or parties to the
exent of his or their pro rata interest in the
account.
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The undersigned hereby apply for a membership for a savings share account in the Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association and
for the issuance of evidence of membership in
the approved form in the joint names of the undersigned as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common. Receipt
is hereby acknowledged of a copy of the charter
and by-laws of said association. Specimens of the
signatures of the undersigned are shown below
and the association is hereby authorized to act
without further inquiry in accordance with writings bearing any such signature; it being understood and agreed that any of the undersigned
who shall first act shall have power to act in all
matters related to the membership and any share
account in said association held by the undersigned, whether the other person or persons
named in the certificate be living or not. The
repurchase or redemption value of any such
share account or other right relating thereto
may be paid or delivered in whole or in part to
any one of the undersigned who shall first act,
and such payment or delivery of a receipt or acquittance signed by any one of the undersigned
shall be a valid and suffieent release and discharge of said association.
On June 10, 1960, th·e Motion for the Summary
Judgment " . . as granted in the cases involving the two
banks and the l\fotion for Dismissal was granted in the
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~f.

original suit of Ben Stewart v. Adeline

Ingalls, pro-

vided however, that the Plaintiff vvas granted leave to
amend the Complaint and Counterclaim within ten (10)
days in order to place in issue the validity of the signature card agreements involved in the action. Since
t1le validity of signature card agreements, which is a
conclusion of law, is dep·endent upon the operative facts
which had already been pleaded in the ·Complaint and
Counterclaim of the Appellant, the Appellant chose to
appeal directly from the orders entered on June 21,
1960, which brings this case at issue before this Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRAN TING RESPOND1

ENT'S MO'TIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS AND IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT.

ARGUlfENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRAN'TING RESPONDENT'S MO'TIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
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APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS AND IN GRANTING RESPONDEN'T'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT.

This Court has had occasion recently to decide several eases on the issues of joint bank accounts. These
include 1-Iolt v. Bayles, 85 Utah, 39 P.(2d) 715; Neillv.
noyce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. (2d) 327; Greener v. Greener,
116 lTtah 571, 212 P. (2d) 194 and most recently, First
Secru.rity Bank of Utah N. A. v. Iphegenia P. Demi:ris,
et al, decided July 8, 1960.
The factor that distinguishes the instant case from
those previously decided is this was an action hy one
cotenant against another in which the C·omplaint alleged
lack of donative intent, mistake and the fact that the
sum in the banks in question were entirely the Ap·pellant's money. The ap·pellant died before the conclusion
of the litigation.
It 'vas urged by the Respondent in the lower Court
that the signature card agreements were regular in form,
that a joint tenancy was created and that the joint
tenancy terminated with the death of the cotenant and
that hence the survivor was entitled to all the funds
not"\\rithstanding the fact that litigation had begun and
notice had been given to the banks in question. The
theory upon which this view is based upon the rule in
Holt v. Bayles, supra, and the real property rule as to
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the tennination of joint tenancy during the course of
the litigation by the death of a cotenant.
It is stated in Holt v. Bayles, supra, at page 719.
"Where such intention is clearly expressed
in a written contract executed by the parties,
which remained unaltered, and there is no fraud,
undue influence, mistake or other infirmity al1eged, the question of intention ceases to be an
issue and the courts are bound by the agreement."
It should be noted in this connection that mistake
was alleged in the Appellant's Complaint which wo1.ud
distinguish this case from Holt v. Bayles, supra.
_However, the reasoning of the rule, enunciated
above, would appear to be questionable. The Court in
that case construed Section 1020, Comp. Laws Utah 1917
(same as u_.c·. 73-4-5) and Specval Session Laws of Utah
191~,

Ch. 8, Section 1. This is substantially the sa1ne
as the Iowa Code 528.64. In Si·neft v. Sineft, 229 Iowa
56, 293 N.W. 841, 843 superseding on rehearing 284 N.W.

91 the code section is construed and it was held:
"This section adds nothing to the words of
the certificate that in any way aids the Appellant
in his action. The legal relationships created by
the establishment of joint bank accounts have
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long perplexed banks, depositors and the courts.
The banks in particular were in a continuous
quandry since until the rights of the depositors
'vere determined, they could not be certain to
'vhom the account might be safely paid. To remedy this situation many of the state passed statutes
substantially identical in import with Sec. 9267.
\r ol. 45 of the Banker's Law Journal 733, 8813,
897 (1928) sets out the legislative enactment of
many of the states as of that date carrying this
1natter. But as stated in an article in the Cornell
Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, pages 96, et sequence,
'These statutes did not settle the rights of the
depositors among themselves.' "
In Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212. P. (2d) 194,
the Court quoted Holt v. Bayles, 39 P. (2d) 715 and
Justice Wolfe's comment was:
''The reason for the conclusive presumption,
in the absence of statute, may not be clear for
seemingly death w·ould have no effect on the
intent with which the joint deposit was created.~'
"Ho,vever since both the parties in the instant case are still alive, we need not concern
ourselves with the presumption of intent where
one of the parties has died before. the asserti~on
of confltcting right.'' (Emphasis our own.)
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116 Utah 571, 212 P. (2d) 194, 199. It should be noted
that the Ap·pellant in this case did assert his rights prior
to his death.
In First Security Bank of Ut.ah, N.A., a Corporation, as Executor of the Estate of James C. Demiris,
deceased, v. lphegeniJa P. Demiris, et al, supra, the
Court stated that they were not overruling I-Iolt v.
Bayles, supra, hut this is difficult to determine since
that case involved a situation where an estate was suing
a surviving cotenant. It was stated,
"The evidence points unerringly to the fact
that insofar as the purpose, desire and intent
decedent -vvas concerned, the transfer of December 5, 1956, was for his convenience in the face
of the exigency that he had to go to the hospital.
Except for the bare fact that a joint tenancy
account was opened there is no circumstance in
this case which suggests any intent on his part to
make a gift or transfer of ownership of this fund
to his wife. On the contrary their marital history
and attitudes, as disclos-ed by the record, would
negative any such intent." (Emphasis ours.)
It \vould not logically see1n to make any difference
vvhere the estate sues the surviving cotenant 'vhether
the money is in the account or has been "~ithdra'vn prior
to death by the surviving cotenant. This would give the
implication that the sole function of the conclusive presuinption in Flolt v. Bayles, supra, was to protect the
bank.
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It \va~ eontended by the Appellant that the filing of
the aetion and the giving of notice terminated the joint
tt~na11ey, if any existed, or, at least, gave the Court
jurisdiction under the survivorship rule (Rule 25, Utah
Rules of Ci·vil Procedure) to litigate the matter after
the death of either of the parties. The Respondent
clahned that the joint tenancy would not be terminated
until a final judgment or successful conclusion was
reached. The contention of the Respondent in this respect
appears to be correet, but only insofar as it affects joint
tenancies ~1n real property. The authority quoted by Respondent, ho\vever, Annotation, "Joint Tenancy-Termination," 64 A.L.R. 2d. 918, deliberately excluded from
its scope the question of joint hank accounts.
''The questions covered here are those of
severance or terrnination of joint tenancies in
either real or personal prop·erty by act of the
joint tenants, or one or some of them. The problems of joint bank accounts have, however, been
excluded, not only because of the doubts which
arise in regard to whether and when a joint bank
account constitutes a joint tenancy, but because
upon any view the bank account cases are special
and peculiar and require separate consideration."
The annotation further determines that commencing an action is not sufficient to terminate a joint tenancy; a successful conclusion of the action is required,
citing Teutenberg v.

Sh~ller,

138 Cal. Ap·p. 2d. 18, 291

P.2d 53. Id. at 956.
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However, in Judge Cardozo's concurring opinion in
Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167, N.E. 506,
66 A.L.R. 870, an opinion which has been followed in a
series of Utah cases relating to the conclusive presumption of j·oint tenancy upon the death of a cotenant, the
followinglanguageisfound:
"As to what the true agreement was, the
door to controversy was open during the joint
lives of the depositors. It was closed upon the
death of either. The question is not here whether
a like result would follow if a suit to establish
an agreement at war with the presumption had
then been pending undetermined. A notice of
revocation is not a notice of lis pendens."
I d. at 880-881.
It should also be pointed out that care is to be used
concerning the use of the Summary Judgment in 6

Moore Federal Practices, 2101-2121. The matter of
whether the Plaintiff's original Complaint stated a cause
of action apparently has been -conclusively decided by

First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, Supra, 'vherein
it was held that a joint bank account was not created
because the decedant had not intended to create the same.
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CONCLlTSION
It will be seen then, that (1) the question of whether
a joint tenancy had been created as between the parties
t he1nselves was a question of fact which should have
been sub1nitted to the trier of facts; and, (2) if a joint
tenancy had been created it was terminated by the filing
of the action and the notice given to the banks, and
that the trial court consequently had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties, and therefore, the
matter should have been heard on its merits. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the Judgment heretofor
entered in this action be reversed, and that the matter
be heard upon its merits.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN E. STONE and
O.A.TANGREN

Attorneys for A.ppella;n.t
601 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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